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“In a certain sense, all communication systems terminate in machines, but the ordinary language 
systems terminate in the special sort of machine known as a human being.”  
Norbert Wiener1 
 
1. Introduction: a new perspective for new bodies 
 The above quote by Norbert Wiener has a flavour of Charles Darwin to it, but where 
Darwin made humans into a special sort of animal, Wiener turns the human into a machine. 
While Darwin’s effort surely provoked more reactions from his contemporary fellow humans, 
Wiener’s does not lack in impact. After all, where Darwin left us all still composed of biological 
matter, Wiener opens the door for something that is at least part mechanical, either in its 
construction or operation. Regardless of how sinister such a change might appear, it is 
nevertheless, just like Darwin’s ideas in On the Origin of Species, more a change of perspective 
than an actual change of human nature. In the preface to the second edition of Cybernetics: or 
Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine2, Wiener writes that:  
 
“The automata which the first edition of this book barely forecast have come into 
their own, and the related social dangers against which I warned, not only in this 
book, but also in its small popular companion The Human Use of Human Beings, 
have risen well above the horizon.” (Wiener, Cybernetics, vii).  
 
If there was already change in the air when the second edition of Cybernetics came out in 1961, 
then there certainly is even more of it today. Many humans have been connected to various 
electronic communications systems for a long time, such as the telephone and the television, but 
                                                 
1
 The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, page 79 
2
 Henceforth, references in parenthesis will be shortened to Cybernetics. 
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the technology of today (2010) provides a much greater exposure and is often hard to avoid on a 
daily basis. The amount and extent of new information networks and links between human and 
machine increase our dependency on these systems.  
 
 While neither Norbert Wiener nor any other individual can take credit for these 
developments on their own, Wiener’s quote, and his works, gives us both a tool for analysing 
information systems, and food for thought. While advancements in technology are usually 
considered a good thing, the question of what it does to society and the individual remains an 
open one. We now live in an age where our access to information is unrivalled throughout 
history, but how much information is too much – and can we even evaluate, process and act on 
such large amounts? Technology gives us a convenient tool with which to access information, 
but it can not be considered a wholly optional tool. In many instances, connecting to an 
electronic information network is both expected and necessary, at work and in private.  
 
This interaction can create a certain dependency, but more importantly it makes us part of 
the systems we connect to. Even with only a telephone at our disposal we become connected to 
it, and even without it we are still part of another system – society. Our bodies are systems, made 
up of parts that must communicate with each other and the world in order to function. The 
thought of man as a machine is not a strange one any longer, we have already arrived at a point 
where we are connected to non-biological information systems and communicate both with other 
humans and with machines through them. Are these connections and dependencies, in spite of 
obvious advantages, really such an asset? Do we need to develop them as far as we can in order 
to increase our access to information, and the use we get out of it, or would we do just as well by 
regressing? For some, our identity as human beings is at stake as well, as we spread parts of 
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ourselves throughout the systems we use. Are we becoming information, are we perhaps 
information already, and do we risk getting lost inside the lines of communication? 
 
 Thomas Pynchon published The Crying of Lot 49 in 1966, not too long after Norbert 
Wiener wrote Cybernetics. Pynchon gives us a very contemporary 1960’s world, one that has 
seen change as attested by Wiener. Progress was evident, for example transistors had replaced 
vacuum tubes in computers, the (unmanned) lunar lander Surveyor 1 launched at the middle of 
the decade and the first manned spaceflight mission to leave earth orbit, Apollo 8, was launched 
at the end of the decade – both integrating various automated and operator-controlled systems. 
However, this was still a few steps behind the world of today with regard to technology. The 
infancy of mechanic/electronic systems is however no hindrance in the novel; there is no lack of 
information or communication systems. In 1984, William Gibson published Neuromancer. 
While the 1980’s had seen considerable technological advancement, such as the advent of 
personal computers and several versions of what was to become the Internet, Neuromancer 
easily tops this, being a vision of the future that is brimming with technology and the problems 
associated with it. Both novels give their protagonists a considerable amount of information to 
work with. But where Gibson gives us a fairly realist, even slightly linear, world where the 
amount of information available is staggering but still fairly accessible, Pynchon has created a 
veritable labyrinth of information3 where few things are certain. Since the novels present 
different starting points for their protagonists, how do these two information systems compare to 
each other in terms of information input, processing efficiency and output? 
 
                                                 
3
 Though it is arguably more straightforward than for example Gravity’s Rainbow. 
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Norbert Wiener’s two books, Cybernetics and The Human Use of Human Beings will be 
used extensively in the thesis, providing the basis for the cybernetics framework used to look at 
the novels by Gibson and Pynchon. There has been written a large amount about cybernetics 
since Wiener wrote his books, but his are a good primer for understanding the basics of 
cybernetics, which is perhaps in part due to the fact that the subject was in its infancy at that 
point and not yet as detailed as it is today. The Human Use of Human Beings was written after 
Cybernetics “In response to a certain demand for me to make its ideas acceptable to the lay 
public, [...]” (Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings4, 15). The book offers what Wiener 
promises, an easily accessible primer to cybernetics, as well as cybernetics in relation to society. 
While Cybernetics is a much more technical book, it nevertheless offers a more detailed account 
of cybernetics than The Human Use of Human Beings, and it will be used both to expand on as 
well as to supply information not found in the latter.  
 
 While the body of criticism on both Neuromancer and The Crying of Lot 49 is 
substantial, very little of it contains direct discussions on cybernetics. Two works that treat 
Neuromancer, Tom Bukatman’s Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern fiction 
and N. Katherine Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics will also be used as a supplement to Wiener. While both works also 
include a look at Neuromancer, they are useful for the more general ideas they present as well. 
Because they are far more recent, they offer a fresher take on human and machine 
communication, and they, unlike Wiener deal mostly with cybernetics-related subjects in fiction. 
Hayles treats the issue of embodiment in the information age, and the nature of information, and 
she is the one dealing most explicitly with cybernetics as such. Bukatman has less of a direct 
                                                 
4
 Henceforth, references in parenthesis will be shortened to The Human Use. 
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focus on cybernetics, but he presents a relevant discussion on human identity and how it is 
shaped by (and shapes) advanced technology, with some emphasis on the concept of cyberspace. 
Much of the other work on Neuromancer only deals with parts of this, such as Philip Elmer-
DeWitt who in Welcome to Cyberspace writes more about the definition of cyberspace, which 
while interesting is not on its own relevant enough in relation to the topic at hand; Veronica 
Hollinger makes an interesting contribution on cyberpunk in relation to postmodernism in 
Cybernetic Deconstructions: Cyberpunk and Postmodernism , and Nicholas Ruddick makes 
some good points, particularly on information theory, in Putting the Bits Together: Information 
Theory, Neuromancer, and Science Fiction. While all these works are good contributions to their 
respective fields, they approach the topic of this thesis somewhat too obliquely, and most are not 
quite extensive enough to be of much direct use, though they have provided inspiration.  
 
In relation to The Crying of Lot 49, William Gleason focuses on the information or 
“postmodern labyrinth” of Pynchon’s book in his essay The Postmodern Labyrinths of Lot 49, 
but mainly with regard to the symbolism in the text; David Seed in Media Systems in The Crying 
of Lot 49 takes an excellent look at the mass media in the novel, but again with less of a direct 
focus on cybernetics. Victoria De Zwaan has a very short, but informative, commentary in 
Pynchon's Entropy, which looks at entropy in Pynchon’s work, but unfortunately she leaves out 
The Crying of Lot 49 and mostly discusses entropy as a concept. In Thomas Pynchon's 
Narratives: Subjectivity and Problems of Knowing, Alan W. Brownlie treats the difficulties of 
gaining reliable knowledge in some of Pynchon’s works, but mostly in relation to the effect this 
has on the reader. The essay Pynchon's Prophesies of Cyberspace by Brian Stonehill takes a 
solid look at cybernetic references, but only in Gravity’s Rainbow. There is some material on the 
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postmodern subject, but this is also covered (more thoroughly in relation to the topic at hand) by 
Bukatman and Hayles.  
 
  Timothy Melley’s Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America 
will be used occasionally. While Melley deals with how conspiracy theories gained ground in 
postwar America as a result of a loss of agency in the individual, he also has some good material 
on nature and the shaping of the individual, and he also treats both Gibson and Pynchon. In 
addition his work has been an inspiration for this thesis as it marks the authors first experience 
with cybernetics in relation to the human subject, so even if it does not appear directly in the text 
it is at least in the background.  
 
 Typically, the fiction analysed with regard to information, technology, human-machine 
communication and such is of a type that lends itself very well to this kind of analysis because it 
already contains many of the mentioned elements, in particular advanced technology (both 
Hayles and Bukatman deal largely with science fiction and cyberpunk literature). However, since 
cybernetics is a theory for studying communications systems in general, not only those based on 
technology, it should be possible to apply it to texts that have less of a technological focus, 
especially as long as they deal with information. Note that the focus will be on applying the 
cybernetics framework to analyse the text, not to deal with cybernetics as a theme. In other 
words, instead of just identifying parts of the text where for example entropy is mentioned and 
explaining its thematic role, I aim to identify the entropy and to explain why it occurs, and how 
the cybernetic aspects that are discussed present important plot junctures in a new light. 
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 By using a cybernetics framework in its original and more technical form it should be 
possible to analyse Neuromancer and The Crying of Lot 49  to see how information is treated in 
these two texts, which represent more and less technologically advanced worlds respectively. 
The more recent literature-related works on cybernetics will be used to provide additional 
information and to contrast with Wiener’s work. With the texts analysed in this way, the next 
step will be to contrast and compare them to see which elements they have in common and not, 
how the different elements interact with one another, and finally what this says about the 
efficiency of the information systems in the texts. 
  
 The first chapter of this thesis will present an overview of cybernetics as treated by 
Wiener in Cybernetics and The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics as treated by other 
authors will be included in the second and third chapters in order to broaden the discussion.  
The goal is to establish the cybernetics framework that will be applied in the subsequent 
chapters, hopefully explaining some of the more important elements of cybernetics, and also 
establishing the terminology associated with it. The chapter will not deal with the most technical 
sides of cybernetics, as this is both largely irrelevant to its application in this context, as well as 
beyond the capabilities and interests of the author. Instead, the focus will be on creating a 
framework that can be applied equally to systems consisting of humans, machines and the two 
combined 
.  
 The second chapter will focus on Thomas Pynchon’s novel The Crying of Lot 49. It will 
identify cybernetic elements in the text and analyse these, with a focus on how the protagonist, 
Oedipa Maas, treats and is affected by information. The systems analysed here will mostly be of 
the human (individual and social) kind, with less human-machine communication. 
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 The third chapter will treat William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer in much the same way 
The Crying of Lot 49 was treated in the previous chapter but with a, perhaps not surprisingly, 
larger focus on communication in machines as well as between humans and machines. As in 
chapter two, the focus will be on the novel’s protagonist, in this instance Henry Dorset Case. 
Further, the two novels will be contrasted and compared on the basis of the findings resulting 
from using the cybernetics framework. The goal is ultimately to explain the differences in how 
the two novels treat information, and how this affects the two protagonists. 
 
 Though cybernetics is at its roots a very technical discipline, it will hopefully help to give 
a different look at both technical and non-technical texts, while keeping the focus on the text 
itself rather than straying too far out into the realms of hard science.  
 
2. Cybernetics: mechanisms of information 
The term “cybernetics” comes from the Greek word “kybernētēs”, meaning “steersman”. 
Cybernetics is in its most broad sense a theory of information, communication and messages. 
(Wiener, The Human Use, 15). Norbert Wiener states the goal of cybernetics thus:  
 
“It is the purpose of Cybernetics to develop a language and techniques that will 
enable us indeed to attack the problem of control and communication in general, 
but also to find the proper repertory of ideas and techniques to classify their 
particular manifestations under certain concepts.” (Wiener, The Human Use, 17). 
 
The “birth” of cybernetics was made possible by collaboration between scientists from many 
different fields, including Wiener, that sought to unite the sciences necessary to develop a unified 
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theory of communication.5 The need for cross-disciplinary work came, among other things, from 
the fact that  
 
“[...] the problems of control engineering and of communication engineering were 
inseparable, and that they centered not around the technique of electrical 
engineering but around the much more fundamental notion of the message, 
whether this should be transmitted by electrical, mechanical, or nervous means.” 
(Wiener, Cybernetics, 8). 
 
The inclusion of transmission by nervous means necessitated that not only mathematicians, 
physicists or engineers be included in the process, but also neurologists, psychologists and others 
who studied the functions of the human being. The human being had to be included because of, 
amongst other things, the increasing development of various automated and more advanced 
human-operated mechanical and electronic systems. One example given by Wiener is the 
construction of (automated) anti-aircraft artillery, and the necessity for the targeting mechanism 
to be able to predict the course of a human-operated plane (Wiener, Cybernetics, 5-6). Humans 
and machines had begun to be more connected than before, and this necessitated the new 
approach of cybernetics.  
 
  Since cybernetics is a theory of communication, and therefore information, it is necessary 
to establish the term “information” Information is both the smallest and the largest building 
block, as it refers to both the smallest parts that constitute communication, as well as 
communication itself. For example; messages consist of information and communication consists 
                                                 
5
 A process described in detail in the introduction to Cybernetics. 
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of messages. Without information, there cannot be communication.. The term information merits 
its own definition in this case; it is a more extensive term than what we might think. The word 
easily invokes various physical associations, such as sheets of paper printed with numbers, 
textbooks and spoken sentences. All of these are acknowledged as information within the 
framework of cybernetics, but to a much larger extent than what we can easily discern through 
our sensory apparatus. Wiener tells us that (under quantum theory), a transfer (or coupling) of 
information also requires a coupling of energy, making the two very hard to separate (Wiener, 
The Human Use, 39). Most forms of interaction require a coupling of energy, and thus 
information, which means that we can for most intents and purposes consider everything as made 
of information (at least during the process if interaction). 
 
 To clarify further, it is useful to consider how interaction between for example particles, 
takes place. If two particles collide, there are several possible scenarios that might result. The 
particles might alter course, one or both might split up into smaller parts, they might combine to 
form a single new particle, and so on. In order for any of these scenarios to take place, we are 
forced to view the particles as consisting of information, as indeed they do; information that 
gives their speed, their position, their mass, their composition, and anything else that determines 
how they will behave in any given situation. We can extend this definition to cover larger objects 
consisting of enormous amounts of single particles, such as humans.   
 
 When considering communication between humans and humans and machines it will not 
do to look at the smallest possible units of information, because observing the behaviour of every 
single particle in this equation amounts to an impossible task. Here we need to resort to studying 
messages of types that are easily recognizable as such, and the systems they are transmitted 
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through. To a human being, messages are limited to signals we can receive through our sensory 
apparatus; visual input, audio input, smell, taste and touch. All these signals are interpreted by 
the brain, where they are converted into electrical signals. To act on the information received, the 
human being employs what Wiener terms “effector organs,” such as arms and legs. The internal 
and external functions in a human are quite similar to that of a machine, as a machine receives 
signals in much the same way, either in an electrical or mechanical fashion, and acts on them by 
using its own type of effector organs (Wiener, The Human Use, 32). In light of this it does make 
sense to compare humans to machines in the study of communication, as Wiener does. 
 
 In order to make use of information, both humans and machines must possess a certain 
set of abilities. First of all, they must be able to receive the information through some sort of 
sensory organ. Second, they must be able to process the information and filter out any 
disturbances (a topic which will be covered later in this chapter). Third, they must be able to 
store the information, at least until it has been acted upon, and at last they must be able to act on 
the information. In order for all of this to take place, the information received must be of a type 
that corresponds to the type the sensory organ can receive and it must give meaning to the 
receiver. In a machine, such as a radio, a signal must match the wavelength and frequency the 
radio is tuned to, and it must decode as sound. If a signal decodes as static, it will partially have 
fulfilled the first requirement; corresponding to the sensory organ of the receiver. It will not 
however have fulfilled the second criterion of giving meaning, since the end receiver of the 
signal is a human which will not get very much out of listening to static. It should be said 
however that in this case, the static might be acted upon by the human receiver, signaling to him 
or her that the radio might need tuning. But, this will not let the signal transfer successfully with 
its original meaning intact. In human communication, especially speech, messages sent must be 
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in a language the receiver can understand, and the message must contain information that the 
receiver can understand. Wiener uses the term “semantically significant information” to cover 
information that manages to get into a transmission line, through the “filters” or processing 
mechanisms connected to it, and to an activating mechanism.  
  
“Semantically significant information in the machine as well as in man is 
information which gets through to an activating mechanism in the system that 
receives it, despite man’s and/or nature’s attempts to subvert it. From the point of 
view of Cybernetics, semantics defines the extent of meaning and controls its loss 
in a communications system.” (Wiener, The Human Use, 94). 
 
 Meaning in itself is also directly linked to our sensory and processing abilities; the same 
goes for machines, at least on a purely logical level. Wiener states that “All logic is limited by the 
limitations of the human mind when it is engaged in that activity known as logical thinking.”  
(Wiener, Cybernetics, 125). The same goes for machines, and especially computers, as no 
machine in existence today (2010) can exceed its processes beyond what its programming 
allows. To a certain extent, Wiener’s statement can be applied to processes other than logical 
thinking alone. Both humans and machines are limited in what they can observe, understand and 
do, based on how their bodies are constructed. This being said, while a brain of one sort or 
another is limited in what it can perceive and do by the sensory organs and effector limbs it 
controls, the brain also limits what the body can perceive and do. Brain, sensory organs and 
effector limbs are all heavily interconnected parts of the same system, and not independent units. 
These bodily limitations, and the possibility of overcoming some of them (or not), will be treated 
further later in this chapter.  
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 “When I control the actions of another person, I communicate a message to him, and 
although this message is in the imperative mood, the technique of communication does not differ 
from that of a message of fact.” (Wiener, The Human Use, 16). In this passage from The Human 
Use of Human Beings, Wiener illustrates another important part of cybernetics; the fact that 
communication and control are closely linked to each other, and that a message is sent with the 
hope that someone or something will act on it. The response expected need not be directed back 
at the sender; but some sort of response or action is nevertheless expected, because sending 
information would otherwise be unnecessary. While the word “control” might give the wrong 
associations in this case, such as an image of a drill sergeant yelling at recruits to make them 
march properly or something similar, this is not the whole meaning of the term, but rather only a 
small part of it.. Whether we send a signal by pressing a button on a computer, pulling a lever on 
a machine or by speaking to another person, we ultimately seek to control the recipient by 
sending them a signal they act upon. If the recipient acts on the signal, it will be because it 
contained sufficient meaning important enough to merit a reply. Even though a signal might 
provoke a response because the sender has some sort of malevolent power over the recipient, this 
is not the only type of signal that gives the sender control. If you take a picture of someone,  the 
mere act of pulling out the camera might make them straighten up and smile, because they have 
been taught that they should try to look good when someone takes a picture of them. In a 
conversation involving two people, there are at the same time two senders and two receivers. The 
one that sends the first message provokes a response from the other person, which in turn sends a 
message back, which again provokes a response from the first person, and so on. In other words, 
while a sender with ill will can control others by communicating with them, all information that 
is sent resulting in a response exerts some level of control over the receiver.  
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When studying what information is, how it is transmitted, the effects of its transmission 
and so on, it is hard to avoid looking at how it is also lost and degraded. While messages of all 
different kinds are continually being transmitted successfully, both reaching their recipient and 
making the recipient act as the message instructs, many messages also fail to reach their 
recipient, or fail to cause the desired effect. Perhaps surprisingly, all information degrades to 
some extent, sometimes noticeably and sometimes not. The term used to cover this degradation 
is entropy.  
 
Wiener defines entropy as the amount of disorganization in a system, making it the 
opposite of information, which is defined as the amount of organization in a system (Wiener, 
Cybernetics, 11). Another way of putting it would be to say that information is order, while 
entropy is chaos. This latter definition in particular gives a useful point of view, since entropy 
leads to a decrease in the quality of a message, thus increasing the chances of 
miscommunication, thus increasing the chances for the message to cause chaos.  
 
Wiener also gives a useful example of how entropy works, in relation to the second law 
of thermodynamics. The second law states that heat cannot flow spontaneously from a low-
temperature material to a high-temperature material, but instead the heat from the high-
temperature material will dissipate to the low-temperature material over time. The result of this 
is that it is impossible for all the heat from, for an example, a heat engine to be converted into 
work, some of the heat will always flow to regions of lower temperature. This also makes it 
impossible to construct a truly closed system or a machine capable of perpetual motion, since 
both would bleed off energy to the outside, and require outside sources to replenish the lost 
energy. In relation to the second law, Wiener states that “That information may be dissipated but 
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not gained is [...] the cybernetic form of the second law of thermo-dynamics.” (Wiener, The 
Human Use, 78). As heat, using the cybernetic definition, is information, this rewriting of the 
second law of thermodynamics is a useful reminder that entropy is ultimately present in any 
system. Entropy is inevitable because information cannot be transferred without interaction, 
interaction that always results in some form of change in the information, a fact that is also 
confirmed by Wiener:  
 
“However, under the quantum mechanics, it is impossible to obtain any 
information giving the position or the momentum of a particle, much less the two 
together, without a positive effect on the energy of the particle examined, 
exceeding a minimum dependent on the frequency of the light used for 
examination. Thus all coupling is strictly a coupling involving energy [...]” 
(Wiener, Cybernetics, 58). 
 
 Before I go on to describe some more concrete examples of how entropy might increase 
in communication, I wish to look at a mechanism that can help decrease the chances of it 
occurring in too large quantities. This mechanism is called “feedback,” and it is present both in 
mechanical and electrical systems and communication, as well as in humans. Feedback is in 
essence a way to monitor a known system in order to ensure that the system is working properly 
before sending a message. The individual components of a system record their performance or 
lack thereof, and should the performance be less satisfactory, the components in question can be 
repaired or deactivated by a central control mechanism. A feedback system might only 
encompass one specific function in a mechanical or electrical system, or it might encompass a 
more complex system such as a human being. In the latter case, there is enough memory 
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available to store a much more extensive list of past performance, which can be used to regulate 
present performance. In addition, more complex systems can have the facilities necessary to 
extrapolate the outcome of a new process on the basis of performance in past, similar processes. 
In humans, feedback can take the form of conditioned reflexes, where a type of behaviour is 
regulated by past experience (Wiener, The Human Use, 33).  
 
A conditioned reflex can manifest itself as something slightly mechanical, for an example 
by ducking when a shadow passes overhead (because the person in question once saw a shadow 
in the corner of their eye, and promptly was hit in the head by a soccer ball). Or, it could 
manifest itself in a conversation, for an example by a person steering away from a certain 
conversational topic because he or she knows that one of the other participants dislikes the topic, 
or by awaiting confirmation from the recipient of an order that the order has been received. 
While both humans and machines employ feedback mechanisms, they differ in that humans are 
usually able to learn from their experience, while machines mainly rely on a very narrow set of 
data – typically by comparing their present performance to one set of data detailing their target 
performance. However, while machines will always respond to feedback as long as the devices 
recording performance and adjusting performance are in working order, humans can choose to 
disregard feedback, or they might do so involuntarily.  
 
The fact that humans can disregard feedback opens up an interesting conundrum. If a 
piece of information reaches through to a human, and the human chooses to disregard the 
information, does this increase entropy? In a very strict sense, perhaps it does, because the 
human acts on the information in a radically different way than the sender intended. At the same 
time, disregarding information is also a way of acting upon it, as it is one of the many possible 
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decisions available in a more complex system like a human. I believe the answer depends largely 
on the reason for disregarding the information. If it is done even if the receiver understands the 
meaning of the information, it can not be said to really increase entropy since the information has 
caused a conscious response in the receiver. If it is done for an example because the receiver is 
unsure of the true meaning of the information, it is really an error in processing, and can thus be 
said to increase entropy.  
 
A typical cause of entropy in electrical systems is background noise; a signal interfering 
with communications in a transmission line, often caused by the interaction between the line and 
the signal sent through it. In order for signals not to be drowned by the background noise they 
themselves create, they need to be of a certain strength (Wiener, The Human Use, 39). 
Otherwise, the information in the signal is disturbed by the energy coupling with the line. 
Background noise of this type can occur in human communication as well, for an example when 
attempting to have a conversation in a very noisy environment where the noise interferes with 
and blocks the participants’ voices. Similar situations can occur in any situation where a human 
being’s sensory organs are being hard pressed or shocked; the energy of the shock blocks out the 
information.  
 
In machines, entropy is usually caused by component or programming failures, 
insufficient power or outside interference. While these problems might be difficult enough to fix, 
identifying the problems is nevertheless a doable task, as well as preventing them. The design of 
the machine is usually known, it usually has a limited amount of functions, internal connections 
and logical options in its programming. Identifying entropy in human communication is on the 
other hand more difficult, since there are more different factors in play. Preventing entropy, or 
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fixing problems caused by it, is potentially an even more daunting task, especially since all 
humans differ in the way they treat information. When it comes to processing, filtering and 
acting on information, humans are affected by such things as past experience, psychological 
state, physical state and environmental variables. In addition, all of these factors might interfere 
and interact with each other, such as reminding someone of their dead father because they are 
depressed because their rheumatism flared up because it rains.  
 
Humans do not only process information based on a standard set of criteria such as 
machines do, they interpret it, and the interpretation is governed by both internal and external 
factors as described above. A message will be interpreted with respect to who sent it, and if the 
sender is present and conveying the message verbally body language, intonation and appearance 
also come into play. Messages will also be scanned for possible double meanings, irony, 
sarcasm, and so on. At any of these stages, it is possible for the receiver to interpret the sender 
wrong. Human communication is without complex, but it is also more vulnerable to entropy 
because of this. Simplifying human communication, while certainly possible, is not the best of 
solutions, since a decrease in complexity also means there is a decrease in the amount of 
information that can be transferred.  
 
Entropy, while inevitable, can to a certain extent be decreased locally in a system, 
provided one can identify the elements of the system where the entropy is increasing. At the 
same time, identifying these elements requires sending and receiving information, therefore 
again potentially increasing entropy. Entropy ultimately affects all information, although the 
extent can differ, which we shall see later in the discussion on Neuromancer and The Crying of 
Lot 49. 
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Thus far I have described some aspects of communication mainly between humans, or 
between machines.  I will now look at some of the aspects of communication between human 
and machine, a topic I will return to later, particularly when discussing Neuromancer by William 
Gibson. Communication between human and machine is a commonplace thing, although the 
form it takes looks less like the communication between humans that we are usually accustomed 
to. Transfer of information between human and machine as well as entropy in this transmission 
are of particular interest, since both are first of all problems when designing human-machine 
communication systems and because both offer a useful contrast between the two main parts in 
such systems.  
 
 “We ordinarily think of communication and language as being directed from person to 
person. However, it is quite possible for a person to talk to a machine, a machine to a person, and 
a machine to a machine.” (Wiener, The Human Use, 76). Wiener writes this in relation to the 
operation of automated power stations, where humans control and communicate with the stations 
remotely, relying on feedback from the system to operate it. In this case, the machine does not 
have a central decision making system built in to it on site, but instead relies on a human to 
evaluate feedback and make decisions based on current data. Most machines found in a 
household operate in much the same manner. Lamps, ovens, vacuum cleaners and other 
appliances are all turned on/off and regulated by their human user, who evaluates their 
performance based on feedback directly from the machines or from the environment. The only 
difference is that most of these machines do not have purpose-built sensory organs that transmit 
feedback directly to their user; instead the user relies on direct observation of them. A lamp for 
example is activated or deactivated based on whether the user needs extra light or not. The 
feedback the user relies on is mainly whether or not the lamp produces any light or not. If the 
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lamp starts to flicker or turns off without interference from the user, the user can for an example 
check if the bulb is in working order or not, whether the electrical cord is plugged in properly, or 
even whether or not there is a power outage(by observing the performance/non-performance of 
other appliances dependent on electrical energy). A personal computer is an example of a device 
producing much more direct feedback. If its operations are successful, the results will be shown 
on the computers screen. Likewise, if its operations are unsuccessful, it will in most cases display 
an error message or similar on the screen.  
 
 Communication between human and machine is problematized by the fact that humans 
and machines do not possess the same type of input/output devices. Machine controls must 
usually be designed with an extra step in mind to accommodate their human user, such as buttons 
or levers, and their performance must be physically visible, whether it is in the form of moving 
pistons or figures on a screen. The most efficient types of input/output for a machine, such as 
electrical signals, are not available directly to a human user. This has the potential to increase 
entropy, since it introduces another component into a system, namely any device needed to make 
the input/output available to use by a human. These devices also tend to simplify the workings of 
the machine to such an extent that it becomes difficult for the human user to evaluate its actual 
performance, instead forcing the user to rely solely on the performance evident in the results the 
machine gets. A personal computer for an example, does not display its myriad of logical 
operations to the user, but instead only displays a representation of its results suitable for viewing 
by the user. In this case, the user has neither sufficient processing power nor understanding to 
review the machine’s performance directly. The lack of a suitable way to communicate with a 
machine also means that humans are ill fitted to take direct part in its inner workings.  
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“[...] in general, any computing machine is used because machine methods are 
faster than hand methods. In any combined use of means of computation, as in 
any combination of chemical reactions, it is the slowest which gives the order of 
magnitude of the time constants of the entire system. It is thus advantageous, as 
far as possible, to remove the human element from any elaborate chain and to 
introduce it only where it is absolutely unavoidable, at the very beginning and the 
very end.” (Wiener, Cybernetics, 119). 
 
While a human element might slow down the workings of a machine, its lack of a way to 
communicate directly with a machine also opens up the possibility that it will misinterpret the 
output from the machine, thus increasing entropy in the system.  
 
However, while humans and machines usually communicate through a very limited 
system adapted to allow a human to physically interface with the machine, there remains a more 
direct option; establishing a direct neurological connection between the human users body and 
brain and the machine. As the brain works by transferring electrical signals to the rest of the 
body, which then translates these signals into physical action, a direct connection with the brain 
can largely remove the limitations encountered in human-machine communication. A prime 
example of such a connection is presented in Neuromancer in the form of cyberspace, an 
advanced version of today’s internet. Cyberspace allows a human to directly access a network of 
computers, controlling the operations mainly through thought. This book will be discussed in 
detail later, but for now it is interesting to present some of the problems that may affect such a 
connection. One is a question of performance; does such a direct connection really give the 
human user complete access to the information stored in the machine? While it without doubt 
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gives the human user a more extensive and more direct access to information, the information 
will still have to be presented in a way the user can comprehend. While the brain is a powerful 
computer in its own right it might not be well suited to processing millions of 1’s and 0’s, being 
more suited to processing representations of larger strings of code. Wiener states that “The 
physical identity of an individual does not consist in the matter of which it is made.” (Wiener, 
The Human Use, 101), and while this may be true, the matter making up the body does limit the 
ways in which the body can work. In relation to cyberspace, this brings up the question of how 
free from bodily limitations an individual connected to it would be. The upper limit of freedom 
would be decided by the brain, since it limits just how much a human can understand, but also by 
the body, since the body is vital in how we as humans define ourselves. And since humans and 
machines are different in how they communicate, how well are they really able to comprehend 
each other?  
 
3. The Crying of Lot 49: please feed the demon 
Thomas Pynchon’s 1966 novel The Crying of Lot 49 lends itself well to being examined 
using a cybernetics framework, because it's oblique relation to detective fiction in general 
necessitates a substantial focus on information. The protagonist, Oedipa Maas, sets out to 
execute the will of her late ex-husband, Pierce Inverarity. As she does this, she stumbles upon a 
mysterious renaissance play called “The Courier’s Tragedy” full of events that apparently 
correlate with real-life occurrences, many of which seem to lead back to Inverarity. As she 
investigates these clues, it starts to look like the shadowy organisation Trystero/Tristero, a great 
source of mischief and conspiracy in the play, might actually exist in real life. While she 
embarks on a classic detective hunt for information, she is at times presented with such large 
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amounts of it that she starts to both feel overwhelmed by the task of making sense of it and to 
wonder whether any of it is really true.  
 
As Wiener tells us, control and communication are closely linked to each other. Messages 
are sent with the intention of provoking some form of reaction; if the sender of a message 
receives a response, he has successfully controlled the receiver enough to produce said response. 
This has the side effect giving a slightly new meaning to the popular tenet “information is 
power”; information is power if it is used, because the sender controls the receiver. In turn, the 
original receiver might control the original sender by sending a response back, but the amount of 
control can easily be limited by how well the original receiver understands the original message. 
If the receiver does not fully understand the message, it might be difficult to produce an adequate 
response, although this can of course happen by chance. At any rate, information that is simply 
received without provoking a response is of less use, since it is not particularly suited to storage 
because of entropy. Large amounts of information can potentially control a receiver if he or she 
is not able to access and process the information properly, because the receiver will then spend 
much effort on trying to make sense of the information, rather than acting on it.   
 
. We have already established that within the cybernetic framework, everything is 
information, but we also know that not all of the information is necessarily accessible. Early in 
the novel, as Oedipa is looking down at a part of San Narciso, she is already becoming aware of 
the fact that information is everywhere.  
 
“[...] and she thought of the time she’d opened a transistor radio to replace a 
battery and seen her first printed circuit. The ordered swirl of houses and streets, 
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from this high angle, sprang at her now with the same unexpected, astonishing 
clarity as the circuit card had. Though she knew even less about radios than about 
Southern Californians, there were to both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of 
concealed meaning, of an intent to communicate. There’d seemed no limit to what 
the printed circuit could have told her (if she had tried to find out) [...]” (Pynchon, 
14). 
 
In a sense, comparing a circuit card to a city is fairly accurate. Scott Bukatman also notes that, in 
this case microchips, look like “urban sprawls” when magnified and viewed from above 
(Bukatman, 110). The size of a circuit, and how it is connected to others, defines (and limits) 
what kind of and how much information it can let through. A city street is a good analogue in 
relation to this. Its connections with other streets limits how much traffic it can handle 
efficiently; too much and the traffic starts slowing down.  
 
The use of a particular street is not only dependent on how efficiently it can get people 
and vehicles from one geographical location to another. The preferences of its users; based on 
concerns such as whether it is considered to run through a safe neighbourhood, whether it offers 
nice scenery, and so on also play their part. Oedipa’s thoughts on San Narciso as a city reflect 
this, because the city and its constituent parts are not so much purely geographical locations, but 
a number of ideas that provoke different associations in an individual. “Like many named places 
in California it was less an identifiable city than a grouping of concepts - census tracts, special 
purpose bond-issue districts, shopping nuclei, all overlaid with access to roads to its own 
freeway.” (Pynchon, 13). From this point of view, a city does have a certain capacity to 
communicate, because different parts of it represent different ideas that are at least in part 
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accessible to the individual. A financial district for an example might just be the result of a single 
individual’s idea that the area is a good place to conduct business in. At some point, for various 
reasons, other people agreed with this sentiment and proceeded to move their business there as 
well. The result is, again, not only a geographical location housing a certain type of upscale 
buildings marked with signs that say “Bank of ...,” but a place that houses a certain type of 
people as well. In addition, people that are not part of the idea of the place might catch a certain 
air from it that says that it is not a place to go skating wearing jeans and a t-shirt, or that it is a 
place where the relation between money and personal status is highly stressed. In other words, 
the system can end up grouping similar types of information together, which again affects what 
other types interact with it. 
 
There is a great variety in the kinds of information in the Crying of Lot 49, ranging from 
the plainly visible to background cues. One possible information channel is the one I just 
discussed, the city viewed as a circuit board. In this instance however, the city represents more of 
an idea of information, rather than an actual source. Therefore it is more useful to look at it, as I 
have done, as an example of information processing, rather than an actual example of the 
information processed by Oedipa. The latter is of course also important, so a look at the different 
types of information that Oedipa processes, or tries to process, is merited. With regard to that, 
one of the key issues that humans come across when they communicate is that they must 
interpret the information they process. As we shall see, this becomes a hindrance for Oedipa 
because of the sheer amount of information she is presented with, which again comes from many 
different sources, many of which are daunting to interpret by nature, and often not even primary 
sources (which is an issue since a secondary or tertiary source in itself offers an interpretation of 
another source, likely increasing entropy in the process).  
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Early in the story, she goes to “Echo Courts,” a motel in San Narciso, to meet her co-
executor, a lawyer named Metzger. At one point, Oedipa turns on the television, and Metzger 
notices that the film running, called “Cashiered,” is one he starred in as a child. As Oedipa and 
Metzger watch the movie, Metzger decides he wants to bet on the outcome. Oedipa is reluctant 
to do so because, as she says, “”[...] the movie’s made.”” (Pynchon, 22). This is one of her first 
experiences with entropy (within the text), and it is a good example of entropy in human 
communication; Oedipa is assuming that Metzger wants to win the bet, which he could easily do 
since he already knows the outcome. Despite this they end up betting, and as it turns out she 
wins. In other words, her interpretation of the situation failed her. Another example of entropy as 
a result of human action presents itself as they watch the movie. Someone responsible for placing 
the film reels in correct order has failed to do so, thereby altering the flow of information 
(Pynchon, 23). Oedipa has Metzger there to tell her what just happened, but as the mistake takes 
place as the movie resumes after a commercial break; it could be difficult to notice that the 
change is a mistake if the viewer had not previously seen the movie. It might easily have been a 
wholly different experience if Metzger had not been there to spot the error.  
 
For Oedipa, the confusion really begins as the story of the Tristero is presented to her 
when she goes to see Richard Wharfinger’s play “The Courier’s Tragedy”. Just before that, she 
is introduced to the postal system W.A.S.T.E by Mike Fallopian, whom she meets at a bar on the 
outskirts of San Narciso. As we shall see, these two sources of information alone shall manage to 
cause a great deal of confusion for Oedipa. 
 
W.A.S.T.E. is an alternative, underground, postal system that aims to break government 
monopoly (Pynchon, 39). When Mike Fallopian describes the W.A.S.T.E system, he states that 
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“To keep it up to some kind of a reasonable volume, each member has to send at least one letter 
a week through the YoYodyne system. If you don’t, you get fined.” (Pynchon, 39). The letter he 
shows Oedipa and Metzger as a typical example of the mail sent with W.A.S.T.E. shows the 
result of this practice, as it does not contain any large amount of useful information, and as the 
sender seems to have the option of simply talking to Fallopian instead of sending the letter. Thus, 
much of the information sent through the system is sent simply to ensure that the system remains 
in use. While information is being sent, little of it is semantically significant, and most of it is 
more akin to background noise or static – signals without the ability to reach an activating 
mechanism that produces a meaningful response from the receiver.  
 
The play “The Courier’s Tragedy” and the events in it that correlate with the events 
connected with the legacy of Pierce Inverarity constitutes the backbone of the story, presenting 
Oedipa with the mystery of the Tristero. The play in itself is a problematic source of information, 
since there are several different versions of the script. Some information, such as Inverarity’s 
connection to the Beaconsfield company which apparently bought the bones of a number of 
American soldiers that were killed and dumped at the bottom of an Italian lake (Pynchon, 46), is 
connected to events in the play, in this case the disappearance of the “Lost Guard of Faggio” 
which suffered the same fate as the American soldiers (Pynchon, 57). While information such as 
this suggests a link between recent events and events in the play, it is difficult to say with 
certainty. In the case of the American soldiers in the lake, the information is provided by Miles, a 
member of the band “The Paranoids,” who is not necessarily the best of sources, as he was not 
there to witness the event (and it does not appear as if he has thoroughly researched the matter).  
Despite this fact, Oedipa does not attempt to get his story confirmed from other sources; rather, 
she is more concerned with the fact that it fits so neatly with the events in the play.  
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One of the most prominent visual cues in Oedipa’s detective hunt is the muted post horn, 
which is associated with the W.A.S.T.E system, but which at the same time is the symbol of the 
Tristero. On the surface, the meaning of the muted post horn is easily discovered, as Oedipa is of 
the opinion that “Whoever they were their aim was to mute the Thurn and Taxis post horn.” (a 
normal post horn, sans mute) (Pynchon, 78). The battle between the postal services of Thurn and 
Taxis and Tristero is thoroughly explained throughout the novel, especially through “The 
Courier’s Tragedy”, and the story supports the idea that the muted post horn is simply a jibe to a 
competitor. A mute placed in a post horn will also produce a quieter, less distinct sound, fitting 
well with the underground nature of the Tristero.  
 
However, both the acronym W.A.S.T.E. and the workings of the postal system with the 
same name offers an alternative, albeit slightly self-contradictory meaning. It is difficult to claim 
otherwise than that a postal system is both an extensive and important channel for 
communication. It is perhaps even more important in Wharfinger’s play, where there are no other 
means of efficient long-distance communication; no radio, television, or telephone. Therefore, 
controlling the postal system is a very efficient way of controlling the flow of long-distance 
communication (such control could also be used to disrupt the communication sent), something 
Professor Emory Bortz, a scholar who has worked a lot with Wharfinger’s plays, suggests to be 
the Tristero’s goal as he discusses “The Courier’s Tragedy” with Oedipa later in the text 
(Pynchon, 135). On one hand, the Tristero definitely aims to stop the Thurn and Taxis system, to 
mute their post horn, but there is also the possibility that the Tristero is in a way muting its own 
post horn, not in the manner of simply making its tone deeper, but in the manner of pushing the 
mute so far inwards that it stops any sound what so ever from escaping. The latter idea, while 
odd, does have some support in the novel; such as the fact that there is a lot of useless 
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information being sent through W.A.S.T.E., creating background noise with the potential to 
interfere with more useful information.  
 
The name of the postal service, W.A.S.T.E., is an acronym for We Await Silent 
Tristero’s Empire (Pynchon, 139). The acronym ties in with the muted post horn, and goes a way 
towards suggesting that the final incarnation of the postal system or whatever other plans the 
Tristero has, will manifest as a silencing of (useful) communication. It is also interesting to note 
that one of the workers at the “Yoyodyne” industrial complex named Stanley Koteks, whom 
Oedipa meets just after being introduced to W.A.S.T.E. and Tristero, is quite adamant on the fact 
that the acronym is not to be pronounced merely as “waste”. ““It’s W.A.S.T.E., lady,” he told 
her, “an acronym, not ‘waste’, and we had best not go into it any further.” (Pynchon, 70). 
Another acronym that turns up later in the story, D.E.A.T.H., stands for Don’t Ever Antagonize 
The Horn (Pynchon, 98). While fitting nicely as a warning to people mistaking W.A.S.T.E. for 
“waste”, it does more to underline the Tristero’s dark nature (though it is interesting to note that 
the one time the acronym appears, it is painted inside “[...]an exhausted busful of Negroes going 
on to graveyard shifts [...]” (Pynchon, 98)). 
 
Another type of visual signal is found in the form of Pierce Inverarity’s stamp collection, 
where a number of seemingly ordinary stamps contain irregularities linking them to the Tristero. 
While the stamps and their age do provide a timeline that seemingly confirms the organisations’ 
activity in America, their main role is perhaps that they attract a possible Tristero representative 
to the auction that concludes the novel. Apart from this, the stamps do not really provide any 
useful new information, and as a source they are not easily accessible, being discovered almost 
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by accident by the philatelist Genghis Cohen who is charged with assessing the stamp collection 
left by Inverarity (Pynchon, 75-79). 
 
As Oedipa plays the detective, she is faced with a wealth of information, a lot of which 
seems to fit neatly together, perhaps too neatly even from her perspective. But as we have seen, 
there is already a great potential for confusion based on the Tristero-W.A.S.T.E connection. The 
following quote nicely illustrates one of Oedipa’s problems, the fact that she receives so much 
seemingly related information over a very short period of time: 
 
“Though she saw Mike Fallopian again, and did trace the text of The Courier’s 
Tragedy a certain distance, these follow-ups were no more disquieting than other 
revelations which now seemed to come crowding in exponentially, as if the more 
she collected the more would come to her.” (Pynchon, 64). 
 
While Oedipa is aware of the fact that she is surrounded by information, that alone is not enough 
in itself; she must also be able to access it and process it for it to be of any use to her. According 
to Wiener; “Semantically significant information in the machine as well as in man is information 
which gets through to an activating mechanism in the system that receives it, despite man’s 
and/or nature’s attempts to subvert it.” (Wiener, The Human Use, 94). Also, she does not only 
see herself as surrounded by information, but also by answers; “As if (as she’d guessed that first 
minute in San Narciso) there were revelation in progress all around her.” (Pynchon, 31). While 
there might be revelation all around her, it need not consist of information that is directly useful 
to the case she is pursuing. Oedipa herself at times doubts the veracity of all the information and 
the seemingly connected events she stumbles upon; “Either Trystero did exist, in its own right, or 
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it was being presumed, perhaps fantasied by Oedipa, so hung up on and interpenetrated with the 
dead man’s estate.” (Pynchon, 88). Since she gains so much seemingly related information from 
different sources, her need to pursue all these leads is understandable. In theory, examining all 
the leads could reveal which of them are in fact connected, and which just share some random 
similarities. The trouble with the approach is that by doing so, she continues to stumble upon 
new, again seemingly related leads. She employs no mechanism by which the less important 
information is filtered out, and the result is that the amount of information she must process 
increases, the strain of this again allowing more information to pass through unfiltered.  
 
Oedipa is introduced to the concept of entropy by the scientist John Nefastis, whom she 
learns about from Stanley Koteks. Oedipa learns of entropy by being given the same example 
Wiener uses in The Human Use of Human Beings, namely that of Maxwell’s demon. Maxwell’s 
demon works as follows: Imagine a closed system made up of a container (A) filled with hot gas 
connected by two tubes to another container (B) that contains a heat engine. One tube runs 
directly from A into the heat engine in B, fuelling it with gas, and the other tube runs from the 
exhaust system of the heat engine, letting the exhaust pass back to A. In each tube there is a 
trapdoor, and each trapdoor is guarded by a “demon” that can sense the speed of the approaching 
gas molecules. As hot molecules are faster than cold ones, the demon guarding the door leading 
from A to B only lets fast molecules pass through thereby fuelling the heat engine. The demon 
guarding the door leading from B to A only opens the door for the slow moving molecules that 
have spent some of their energy fuelling the machine. By doing so, the two demons ensure the 
heat engine always has hot molecules to run on, while they at the same time recycle the fuel the 
engine has already used, thereby apparently creating perpetual motion. (Wiener, The Human 
Use, 28-29) 
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This design only works because of the way it treats information. As Wiener puts it “In 
nineteenth century physics, it seemed to cost nothing to get information.” (Wiener, The Human 
Use, 29). However, as we know within cybernetics the term “information” covers everything, in 
this case the molecules the demons sort, the speed of the molecules, and the demons themselves. 
The demons are part of the system, and we have to consider the entropy for both the gas and for 
the demons, not for the gas on its own (Wiener, Cybernetics, 58). In order to sort the molecules, 
the demons have to gain information about them, specifically whether they move fast or slow, 
which will result in some of the information in the gas molecules being transferred to the demons 
each time they evaluate them. Though it would take time, eventually too much information 
would flow from the molecules to the demons, and the system to be rendered inoperable, a 
process that could only be reversed by introducing an external source of power (Wiener, The 
Human Use, 29-30). The system could over some time avoid a localized increase in entropy, but 
only until a certain threshold was reached.  
 
John Nefastis has constructed a machine similar to the one Maxwell describes, one he 
believes will work if a so called “sensitive” interacts with the demon by staring at a picture of 
Maxwell (Pynchon, 84). Nefastis is quite convinced his machine works, but Oedipa is more 
skeptical. “But had Clerk Maxwell been such a fanatic about his Demon’s reality?” (Pynchon, 
85). Although asking Maxwell is out of the question, I believe we can assume with some 
certainty that he was describing a theoretical principle, rather than an actual demon. And as we 
know, entropy can not be avoided by neither Maxwell’s nor Nefastis’ machine. Oedipa puts it 
rather elegantly when she is told of Nefastis and his machine by Stanley Koteks; “”Sorting isn’t 
work?”” (Pynchon, 68). Koteks, like Nefastis, is still working by what Wiener calls “nineteenth 
century physics,” his reply being that “”It’s mental work,” Koteks said, “But not work in the 
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thermodynamic sense.”” (Pynchon, 68). But as we know, a transfer of information involves a 
coupling of energy as well, so even though thoughts might appear as being information-related 
work alone, they do involve “work in the thermodynamic sense”.  
 
 Oedipa has the gist of it; that information is altered, and eventually destroyed by entropy. 
The element that introduces most of the entropy in The Crying of Lot 49 is human; not only 
Oedipa herself, but also the myriad of sources she gets information from. The director of “The 
Courier’s Tragedy,” Randolph Driblette, illustrates one of the key problems humans face when 
processing information when he says “”The words, who cares? They’re rote noises to hold line 
bashes with, to get past the bone barriers around an actor’s memory, right? But the reality is in 
this head. Mine.”” (Pynchon, 62). Despite her apparent understanding of information and 
entropy, and the fact that she is presented with a large number of sources and a lot of 
information, Oedipa is not thorough in checking the validity of the information she has received 
by going back to the source she got it from. Instead, she seems to prefer to validate it by 
comparing it to the other information she has, or by searching for new information. While this 
tactic can work, it can fail if any false information is used in the validation attempt. Oedipa 
wants answers, but her processing of the information that might give her answers is unstructured, 
and not sufficient to prevent or reduce entropy. 
 
Oedipa’s quest for answers leads her further and further into a mode of looking at 
information that is strikingly similar to the cybernetic definition, namely that everything is in 
essence comprised of information. This is particularly evident towards the end of the book, 
where the reader is allowed to glimpse Oedipa’s thoughts on the city of San Narciso; 
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“For it was now like walking among matrices of a great digital computer, the 
zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles right and left, 
ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets there would either be 
a transcendent meaning, or only the earth.”(Pynchon, 150). 
 
One could argue that Oedipa is in essence correct in this case, at least partially. The information 
that makes up everything around her might well be represented by ones and zeroes, although it 
might be safe to assume that she does not really see everything in code (like Neo in The Matrix), 
but rather that the amount of information she is receiving through different channels is 
overwhelming her, making it appear to her as if everything is (accessible) information. However, 
and this is perhaps the key difficulty Oedipa faces, whether or not the world can be viewed as 
information matters little if she is not able to extract some meaning from it, or as Wiener puts it: 
“All logic is limited by the limitations of the human mind when it is engaged in that activity 
known as logical thinking.” (Wiener, Cybernetics, 125). This is also shown, again in relation to 
the city, when she spends a night drifting through San Narciso; seeing a multitude of painted post 
horns, hearing people talking about using W.A.S.T.E, and other things related to the mystery she 
is trying to solve (Pynchon, 88-104). Here, the idea of the city as a circuit card, flowing with 
information, is to a large extent confirmed, but it is also evident that she is either following the 
wrong circuits, unable to access the information properly, or both.  
 
There is, to put it mildly, a lot of information being presented to Oedipa. The quality of it 
however, is generally questionable. The safest source of information would appear to be the 
script for “The Courier’s Tragedy”, but the fact that it exists in different, conflicting versions 
makes it hard to decide which one to trust. The real-life events that mimic the play, such as the 
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American soldiers who were all thrown in a lake and had their bones fished up to be made into 
charcoal just like “The Lost Guard of Faggio,” might seem like they can not be based on 
coincidence, but this is hard to verify. The muted post horn and the acronym W.A.S.T.E, while 
they appear in situations apparently linked to the Trystero, do not provide any useful information 
on their own. In general, the information Oedipa has to deal with is presented to her in a 
disorganized and fragmented way, but appears to all fit together neatly if one wants it to. In a 
way, it boils down to how much Oedipa is willing to trust in coincidence, or to what extent she 
wants to see answers.  
 
The problem Oedipa faces here is that of information or signal type. There is “The 
Courier’s Tragedy”, which is first of all a play and not a proper historical account, and secondly 
it is delivered to her both in the form of pure text (in several different versions) and as speech. 
The latter is also complicated by the fact that the actors’ interpretations alter the way the 
information comes across. Then there are the myriads of hints gathered from conversations with 
a great variety of sources, in addition to information not directly connected to Oedipa’s main 
questions, such as the conversation with Nefastis. Then there are the textual clues such as 
W.A.S.T.E., and lastly, there are the visual clues; ranging from the muted post horn to 
Inverarity’s stamp collection. Just as electronic signals at certain wavelengths can interfere with 
each other and even cancel each other out completely, so do the different signals Oedipa receives 
interfere with each other. Many of them contain very similar information, which makes it 
difficult to keep them separated; a fact that ultimately makes it hard to separate useful from 
useless information, which again increases entropy.  
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Oedipa displays a hunger for information, and one would initially presume that more 
information is preferable to less information, but this only holds true if the total amount of 
information is less than or equal to the total amount the receiver is able to process. Wiener notes 
that a human “[...] is then likely to perform a complicated type of behaviour efficiently very 
close to the edge of an overload, when he will give way in a serious and catastrophic way. This 
overload may take place in several ways: either by an excess in the amount of traffic to be 
carried, [...] (Wiener, 151), the latter certainly being a concern for Oedipa. A computer that is 
equipped to optimally handle a certain number of operations that total to a certain amount of data 
will not necessarily crash when faced with an extra workload, but it will process data at a slower 
rate, increasing the chances of information entropy. And unlike a human, a computer will always 
try to optimize how it handles data to avoid undue strain on the system. Oedipa is concerned with 
processing the information she is given, which is illustrated as she is thinking about Inverarity’s 
business interests: “She would give them order, she would create constellations [...]” (Pynchon, 
72).  But she is also trying hard to find answers, which makes her pay less attention to the 
efficiency of her processing. This reflects the way she deals with the mystery of the Tristero as 
well; she wants to enforce some order to the information she has received, and create clear 
connections between the different units of information. She does not however seem to be able or 
willing to do this in increments or to filter out information that is of dubious value. She wants to 
use all of the information and to process it as a whole in order not to miss something. While the 
idea is good, the process is less than efficient.  
 
To an extent, Oedipa might be aware of all this, which is illustrated by the following 
quote: 
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“Oedipa wondered whether, at the end of this (if it were supposed to end), she too 
might not be left with only compiled memories of clues, announcements, 
intimations, but never the central truth itself, which must somehow each time be 
too bright for her memory to hold; which must always blaze out, destroying its 
own message irreversibly, leaving an overexposed blank when the ordinary world 
came back.” (Pynchon, 76). 
 
The truth is in a sense “too bright for her memory to hold”, but not necessarily because the truth 
itself requires such a large amount of available storage, but because all the information she 
possesses that might contain the truth already takes up too much space and has become so 
disorganized and corrupted that little useful can be gained from it. Oedipa wants answers, but 
while the end use for the information is finding out who or what the Tristero is, that goal in itself 
is a rather unclear one. Why does she want to know about the Tristero? We do not know if it is to 
satisfy her own curiosity, to simply to bring order into the mass of disorganized information she 
has, to expose the Tristero to the public, and so on. At times it seems unclear whether she herself 
knows the answer, and while what she needs might be within her grasp or could already be so, a 
lack of a clear focus becomes a hindrance. Because all the information she possesses that might 
contain the truth already takes up too much space and has become disorganized and corrupted, 
there is the risk that little useful can be gained from it.  
 
Simply going by the tenet “information is power,” Oedipa should have power in 
abundance, but instead the information has power over her. Unfortunately for her, she mostly 
receives information, and often there is no easily reached sender to send a response back to. The 
quality of the information and the difference in signal types, coupled with her processing 
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capabilities leaves something to be desired. The result is that she is largely at the mercy of the 
information she receives; she can not do much with it except to use it as a motivator to go 
looking for more, but the information she already has interferes with both itself and new 
information. A transfer of information equals a coupling of energy, and the amount of 
information Oedipa receives drains her energy and leaves entropy to reign freely. As Timothy 
Melley notes; “Thomas Pynchon’s characters frequently believe they have stumbled on a 
massive plot, but are unable to confirm its existence.” (Melley, 16). 
 
4. Neuromancer: connecting the whole 
In Neuromancer, we follow the protagonist Case, who does most of his work and 
adventuring in cyberspace, also called the matrix – Gibson’s version of today’s internet. “Case 
was twenty-four. At twenty-two, he’d been a cowboy, a rustler, one of the best in the Sprawl.” 
(Gibson, 11). The term cowboy is an apt job-description, at least if we compare Case to the 
typical Hollywood-cowboy, entailing a certain disregard for the law and a certain amount of risk.  
Case’s relationship with information is a closer one, and a more professional one than Oedipa’s. 
It is professional in the way that Case works with information for a living, and close in the 
manner of the connection he has to information through cyberspace, and in the manner this 
connection  further increases his dependency on information.  
 
At the beginning of the story, Case has been cut off from cyberspace; a disgruntled ex-
employer has taken the step to render his nervous system incapable of interfacing with the matrix 
as revenge for Case’s taking something that was not his. The fact that Case is unable to enter 
cyberspace shows us exactly how dependent he is on it. “For Case, who’d lived for the bodiless 
exultation of cyberspace, it was the Fall.” (Gibson, 12). This illustrates one important point when 
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considering Case’s relationship with cyberspace, namely that while he relies on it for much of 
what he does as a professional , it entails much more than just work for him. As we shall see 
later, this has much to do with how he views his body and the “real” world versus the world he 
can access in cyberspace. Case seems, if not addicted to, then at least quite dependant on his 
work. While it involves accessing the matrix, there is nothing stopping him from accessing it in 
non-work related circumstances. However, in my opinion there is one thing that links his love for 
cyberspace to the job he does while connected to it, and that is the fact that it necessitates taking 
risks. And the risks he is taking, the satisfaction of having those risks rewarded and the 
satisfaction of solving the problems he is presented with seem to constitute much of the thrill he 
gets out of cyberspace.  
  
In the time he is not able to access cyberspace, Case grows careless, close to suicidal. His 
new employer, Armitage, who will help him in reestablishing his access, neatly sums up Case’s 
attitude towards life without it when he says “’Our profile says you’re trying to con the street 
into killing you when you’re not looking.’”(Gibson, 40). While this degage attitude illustrates 
Case’s dependency, it might not only be the result of his lack of it. It also appears that displaying 
this risky behaviour to a certain extent alleviates his abstinences, at least in the situations where 
he successfully manages to get someone to come after him, or believes he has done so. When he 
is first being shadowed by Molly, Armitages’ hired muscle, close before being introduced to his 
new employer for the first time, the drugs in his body combined with an adrenaline surge 
provides him with the following revelation:  
 
“Because, in some weird and very approximate way, it was like a run in the 
matrix. Get just wasted enough, find yourself in some desperate but strangely 
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arbitrary kind of trouble, and it was possible to see Ninsei as a field of data, the 
way the matrix had once reminded him of proteins linking to distinguish cell 
specialties.” (Gibson, 26).  
 
In a way, the drugs, the thrill and the paranoia combine to supply him with a form of ersatz-
matrix. While this might be positive, we do not get to see the long term effects of such a brief 
exposure, but I believe it safe to say that the result might just as well have been one of frustration 
rather than solace.  
 
I would perhaps not go as far as Bukatman who, perhaps slightly bluntly, states that 
“Humans become prisoners of the interface. Case’s own painful withdrawal from the ecstatic 
conditions of cyberspace reveals his status as a prisoner, he is literally addicted to the Cartesian 
vectors of cyberspace.” (Bukatman, 285). While I agree that technology offers a great potential 
for addiction, especially considering its potential for power, I would say that while Case is 
certainly dependent on cyberspace, he is not quite the addict yet. He does spend long stretches of 
time connected to the matrix, but he also spends considerable time outside of it – not quite what 
you would expect from the typical addict. Another point is that a lot of his time spent in 
cyberspace is used to do work he has been hired to do, not to be connected for the sake of getting 
away from the outside world. While he suffers withdrawal symptoms of sorts when not able to 
access cyberspace, this is not only the result of being cut off from the “bodiless exultation of 
cyberspace,” but largely the result of being cut off from doing what he is good at and takes pride 
in doing. If one is to call Case an addict, one must at least acknowledge the fact that he is not a 
typical addict.  
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Case’s vision of Ninsei gives us a glimpse of how he sees information. Through his work 
in cyberspace he is already well used to existing in an environment consisting wholly of 
information, where all his surroundings can potentially be accessed and analyzed. In other words, 
Case is already used to taking and employing a fully cybernetic view of reality, or virtual reality 
as it were. The parallel to Oedipa and her view of San Narciso is quite clear, and the fact that 
both novels touch upon cities as patterns of information is perhaps not surprising; I have already 
looked at how a city can, in Oedipa’s case, be likened to a circuit board. However, Case and 
Oedipa’s visions of their respective cities also provide us with a strong contrast. Where Oedipa is 
unused to viewing everything as information, sensing only a vague intent to communicate in the 
pattern of the city, Case is accustomed to taking this view. For Case, the information that 
constitutes the city would also be much like the fields of data in the matrix; information that can 
be received, accessed, processed and acted upon, but not necessarily information that attempts to 
communicate as if controlled by a single will. Although this latter view must be modified to a 
certain extent when Case learns of and comes into contact with the artificial intelligence 
Wintermute, I do not believe that it must be modified all that much. Unlike Oedipa, who 
experiences the city as one large mass of information, Case knows from cyberspace that it is 
made up of many parts, of many different computers and operators. He also knows of AI’s and 
some of their capabilities already, and while he experiences what one single AI can accomplish 
on its own, he knows that there is not one single entity controlling everyone’s experiences in 
cyberspace.   
 
Another important fact about the difference between Oedipa and Case’s view of their 
respective cities is whether or not they are able to confirm that their visions are rooted in reality. 
Oedipa on one hand gets no such confirmation, and it is doubtful whether there is any 
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information available that could give her an answer, and also whether or not she would be able to 
access and process any such information, should it exist, to produce a definitive answer. In 
Case’s world, there are several things that allude to the existence of cities as information 
patterns. First of all, cities are already represented as information patterns on electronic maps, 
whether inside or outside of cyberspace.  
 
“Program a map to display frequency of data exchange, every thousand 
megabytes a single pixel on a very large screen. Manhattan and Atlanta burn solid 
white. Then they start to pulse, the rate of traffic threatening to overload your 
simulation. Your map is about to go nova. Cool it down. Up your scale. Each 
pixel a million megabytes. At a hundred million megabytes per second, you begin 
to make out certain blocks in midtown Manhattan, outlines of hundred-year-old 
industrial parks ringing the old core of Atlanta...” (Gibson, 57).  
 
While this might not at first appear as a very good parallel to Case’s vision of the actual city, the 
comparison has some merit because of the importance of technology present in the world he 
inhabits. Advanced technology is an important component of the every day lives of Case and his 
companions, and electronic information transfer has seemingly taken over completely for some 
non-electronic systems, such as today’s postal service, and partially in other areas such as 
communication between individuals. Case can already see his city as an information pattern, 
which gives a good representation of the city because of the extensive use of electronic 
communication. Oedipa can not easily view her city as an information pattern, and the amount of 
electronic communication present in it is far lower. Viewing a city as an information network in 
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Neuromancer makes sense because of the individual’s daily interaction with technology, and for 
professionals such as Case it can to an extent be viewed as a necessity.  
 
 Another interesting distinction between Case and Oedipa is the extent to which the 
comparisons between technology and cities are made. Oedipa likens the city to a circuit board, 
but the comparison is not used the other way around. As we have seen in Neuromancer so far, 
the same comparison as in The Crying of Lot 49 can be made. However, as Case is testing his 
new computer provided by Armitage, the comparison also in Neuromancer goes the other way 
around when the computer goes through an introductory presentation of cyberspace: “’A graphic 
representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. 
Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and 
constellations of data. Like city lights, receding ...’” (Gibson, 67). The light of course is data, or 
hot spots of data depending on the level of magnification. The receding city lights show that the 
data clusters in cyberspace can be viewed in much the same way as the streetlights (and other 
light sources) in a city; if they are receding you are effectively zooming out, gaining altitude and 
a better view of the whole complex. If you zoom in, the spots of light will grow bigger, but you 
will see fewer of them albeit in more detail. The architecture of cyberspace allows you to get 
your bearings easier, to find out in which direction to go to get to the target information, and 
finally to close in on the details you are after. In other words, if the data fields of cyberspace are 
cities, it is a city that it is difficult to get completely lost in. This is unlike the city of San Narciso, 
where Oedipa wanders lost at night through dim streets, believing but often unable to confirm if 
she is really seeing useful signs and other bits of information, and unable to zoom out to check if 
she is on the right track. To her, the mass of information that is the city is difficult to break up 
into details. The fact that cities are compared to information systems and the other way around 
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goes to show exactly how important, and integrated technology is in Case’s world. Bukatman 
points out that “The very first sentence of Neuromancer establishes the impossibility of a “real” 
space existing apart from its electronic analogue: “The Sky above the port was the color of 
television tuned to a dead channel.”” (Bukatman, 148). And in Neuromancer, the virtual reality 
is not easily separated from the real world. The virtual reality already mirrors parts of the real 
world, and it is linked to the life of many people, whether they are inside it or not. Even before 
we get to the descriptions of cities in relation to information networks, the link between 
technology and the real world has already been established. It makes sense, in the context of 
Neuromancer, to view a city as an information network to a certain extent, simply because the 
interaction and dependency on advanced technology is quite normal, and perhaps even 
unavoidable in some instances.   
 
I have already mentioned that Oedipa does not, and probably can not, confirm her 
alternative view of San Narciso in any satisfactory way. Even if she was able to do so, it is not 
necessarily safe to assume that she could access any information inherent in the city. For Case, 
the situation is different, because he indeed does get his vision verified. As he speaks to the AI 
Neuromancer about the death of his short-time girlfriend Linda Lee, Neuromancer reveals the 
following about both Linda’s death and about reality outside of cyberspace: “’No. I saw her 
death coming. In the patterns you sometimes imagined you could detect in the dance of the 
street. Those patterns are real. I am complex enough, in my narrow ways, to read those dances.’” 
(Gibson, 305). Exactly how these patterns can be read is not made clear, but it is tempting to see 
this as a sophisticated application of statistical mechanics as discussed by Wiener in Cybernetics 
(chapter II). In other words, the AI might just be able to get enough data to use its formidable 
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processing capabilities to predict the behaviour, not only of single particles in a system, but of 
humans and machines as well.   
 
Both Neuromancer and Wintermute would have to experience humans as data, and that 
data could be directly analysed, or be used to calculate statistics. We do not know exactly how 
the AIs’ gather data on humans; or rather we do not know exactly how much data on a single 
human they can gather. Presumably the data would often be limited to what could be gathered 
from visual or audio observations and such, and it would at least be difficult to gather more 
“internal” data unless the subject being observed was connected to cyberspace – in other words 
the AIs’ would not always have the option (if at all) of directly downloading information from a 
human brain. Any statistical models would therefore most likely contain quite a few unknowns, 
but they would be sufficient to predict behaviour to a satisfactory degree. We do know that both 
Neuromancer and Wintermute are able to predict human behaviour, and plan accordingly, but the 
fact that their plans do not always work exactly as intended shows that they have not managed to 
remove all the unknowns from their statistics. No matter how it is done though, it is safe to 
assume that, while Case now knows that there are strong similarities between the data fields of 
cyberspace and of reality, he is not in a position to access the real-life data to such an extent as 
he can access data in cyberspace.  
 
Case and Oedipa also differ in two basic respects relevant here, namely those of 
information access and information processing. We have already seen that while Oedipa has 
substantial access to information, the information comes through many different channels, some 
of which are difficult to access on the basis of the type of signal they send out, and some that 
become difficult to access in the cacophony that results from all the different signal types Oedipa 
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receives. In addition we have also seen that Oedipa’s processing capabilities are not optimal, as 
she is in essence an amateur at the work she ends up doing. The technology level in The Crying 
of Lot 49 is also rather low, especially when compared to Neuromancer, and a lot of the 
information is either transferred in written (paper) form or verbally. When the information is 
being processed, and has been processed, it is either stored in written form or mentally. This is a 
stark contrast to Neuromancer, where electronic transfer of information is the rule rather than the 
exception. Although it is often transferred as audio or text, it is also transferred in holographic 
form, especially in cyberspace. And, whereas Oedipa must be content with using her sensory 
apparatus to watch television or making a phone call, Case can have signals downloaded directly 
into his nervous system. Although Case, and his colleagues, store information mentally, they also 
have the option of storing it electronically, which gives them the option of playing back 
messages in their original form, or connecting research directly to the original material (such as 
when Case uses his computer to do background checks on for an example company names that 
appear in his research).  
 
Another big advantage of the technology Case has at his disposal is that can do a lot of 
work on its own, such as searching for information, with the operator only needing to provide 
search parameters or such. This makes it much easier to gain new information, with a slimmer 
chance of error caused by the human operator. In addition, the information available in 
cyberspace is accessible pretty much all the time, provided one has a terminal to connect to it 
with. All this contrasts with the amount of work Oedipa must go through to gain new 
information; finding the right person or the right written source, which in itself requires 
information like names, addresses, telephone numbers, book editions, opening hours and so on, 
and then accessing it manually by asking the right questions or by reading.  
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Another advantage Case has because of his cyberspace access is the fact that cyberspace 
is at least to some extent easier to analyse and understand, because most of the information (but 
not all, something I will come back to later) making up cyberspace is directly accessible. 
Bukatman touches on this, saying that  
 
“J. David Bolter has stressed that electronic space is, in many ways, simpler to 
understand than its physical or mathematical counterparts, precisely because it is 
“an artifact, a constructed space that must function in thoroughly predictable ways 
in order to serve its technological purpose.”” (Bukatman, 151). 
 
Whether or not cyberspace is fully predictable to Case or the other cowboys is obviously limited 
by their understanding of it, but at any rate we can assume that Case avoids many of the 
unknowns that Oedipa must suffer in the real world.  
 
While both Case and Oedipa work with information during the course of their respective 
stories, they are doing it from their own points of departure. Oedipa has limited experience when 
it comes to accessing and processing information on the scale required for her to do her detective 
work and she does not have access to a particularly impressive array of mechanisms that might 
help her do her work. This also means that she has to do quite a bit of work, mainly manual 
work, when looking for answers. Case however, is a professional when it comes to working with 
information, both because of the nature of the work he does (“hacker” is an apt description) and 
because of where he does it; in cyberspace, a place where accessing and processing information 
is a directly observable necessity. Cyberspace, the technology connected to it and the technology 
of equal sophistication used when outside of cyberspace is also an immense advantage because it 
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eases Case’s workload. The fact that Case is so adept at working with information is at least 
partially due to his mechanical resources, and his linkage with them. He is good at the work he 
does because he is assisted by machines, and because he is skilled when it comes to making the 
machines perform the tasks he needs them to do. As Bukatman puts it; “The body is 
paradoxically extended by its own disappearance – the subject’s control is increased by its 
implosion within the cyberspaces of electronic technology.” (Bukatman, 315). Wiener says that 
“In a certain sense, all communication systems terminate in machines [...]” (Wiener, The Human 
Use, 79), and humans are counted as a special kind of machine. Further, he tells us that “[...] in 
general, any computing machine is used because machine methods are faster than hand 
methods.” (Wiener, Cybernetics, 119). Case is not the “ordinary” kind of human machine, but a 
much more efficient one thanks to his direct connection to the machines he uses. The work the 
machines do for Case is presumably also of a better quality, since it is performed by systems 
optimized for the tasks, lessening the chances of errors occurring. Unlike Oedipa, Case seems to 
take more, or at least as much, pleasure in the processes involved in finding answers, rather than 
finding the actual answers. I believe the effect of this is rather evident, especially when 
comparing Case to Oedipa, as Case’s obsession and skill evident in his processing means that he 
suffers far less confusion than Oedipa does.  
 
 We already know from Wiener that “All logic is limited by the limitations of the human 
mind when it is engaged in that activity known as logical thinking.” (Wiener, Cybernetics, 125). 
This statement covers humans and what a their bodies as processing units can accomplish, but it 
also applies to the artificial intelligences and other computers in Neuromancer, and they are 
limited in the same way by their minds or programming. 
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Case offers us some interesting insight concerning the capabilities of cyberspace, and of a 
human in cyberspace, as he gets ready to use a device (“simstim”) that will let him see through 
Molly’s eyes and feel what she feels. “He knew that the trodes he used and the little plastic tiara 
dangling from a simstim deck were basically the same, and that the cyberspace matrix was 
actually a drastic simplification of the human sensorium, at least in terms of presentation [...]” 
(Gibson, 71). In other words, the full capabilities of the human sensory system are not accessible 
when jacked into cyberspace. This has an effect on what kind of input a human operator can get. 
While the simplified capabilities of the human sensorium will present the operator with less 
detailed and less total information to process (which would also limit the extent of the output 
from the operator), this would also allow for a greater level of focus and fewer irrelevant 
elements. It is not clear whether input is simplified because of limitations in technology or in the 
human body, but it nevertheless suggests that human operators are unable to comprehend certain 
parts of the information available to them in cyberspace.  
 
This view is supported by N. Katherine Hayles in a discussion of visual representations 
of computer code, which also uses Neuromancer as an example, saying that Gibson “[...] 
represents the data arrays of a global informational network as solid polygons in a three-
dimensional space that his protagonist, transformed into a point of view, or pov, can navigate as 
though flying through the atmosphere.” (Hayles, 228), and she also points out that this 
representation is based on the viewers assumption of the code and makes up an imagined space 
rather than a material one (Hayles, 229). In other words, since humans lack the ability to view 
the raw code of cyberspace which must be converted into something they can view, they can not 
fully comprehend all parts of cyberspace since the true form of the code is hidden from them. 
Bukatman has a slightly different take on the subject when he says that  
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“The reductionism of cyberspace also extends to its definition as an abstraction of 
the data in all the computers within the human system, a reprogramming which 
reduces the complexity to avoid an overload and permit the assimilation by 
human perception (as in the map of the Sprawl: “Cool it down,” Gibson advises) 
[...]” (Bukatman, 152).  
 
How large a part a potential overload plays when it comes to the visual versus the non-visual 
representation of the cyberspace code is hard to say, and it is not necessarily very relevant in any 
case; humans probably would not be able to access the raw code of cyberspace at all. 
Representing the code visually to “permit the assimilation by human perception” is the key.  
 
 One theme that runs throughout the story is the typical “cowboy’s” disdain for his or her 
own body. As Case puts it when he recounts the story of how he lost the ability of connecting to 
cyberspace; “The body was meat. Case fell into the prison of his own flesh.” (Gibson, 12). This 
disdain is brought up again when Case is getting ready to try out his simstim deck; “Cowboys 
didn’t get into simstim, he thought, because it was basically a meat toy.” (Gibson, 71). This 
attitude is not necessarily directed towards the body as such but to the limitations it imposes, 
which offer a counterpoint to the experience of connecting to cyberspace, where nothing but the 
“disembodied consciousness” (Gibson, 12) exists. In that state, Case and the other cowboys can 
exert an amount of power they can not access in real life; they can depend on their minds in a 
state where they are freer from the body than in real life.  It is hardly difficult to understand that 
Case, so in love with cyberspace, finds it difficult to rely more on the “meat” part of himself.  
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 The ideal for Case would seem to be ending up like his old teacher, McCoy Pauley, 
nicknamed the Flatline because of his tendency to do things in cyberspace that dropped his EEG 
readings to zero – represented by a flat line indicating brain death, who has had his memory 
downloaded into a memory bank after his sentence. In his present state, the Flatline exists only as 
the data that made up his personality, he is able to connect to cyberspace, and seems to have 
attained a state free from his body. Therefore, his state could seem ideal for someone expressing 
the typical cowboy attitude towards the flesh.. However, Case’s thoughts about the Flatline 
before he is able to speak to him show unease; “It was disturbing to think of the Flatline as a 
construct, a hardwired ROM cassette replicating a dead man’s skills, obsessions, knee-jerk 
responses ...” (Gibson, 97). This does to a certain extent suggest that his apparent disapproval of 
his own body is not entirely as serious as it might seem, but perhaps in part more of an 
expression of pride at what he can do in cyberspace with his mind, in the way a craftsman 
depending solely on hand tools might look down on those using mechanical tools for mass-
production. When Case first speaks to the Flatline, the Flatline appears very much as a pattern of 
information rather than a personality, using repetitive language, and providing answers that 
sound like a result from a search engine – for example, as the answer to who Case is; “”Miami, 
joeboy, quick study.”” (Gibson, 99). 
 
In essence, the Flatline is, in his present state, only an information pattern. He has little 
extra memory in which to store new experiences, and one could presume that it would be 
difficult for him to develop far beyond the information on the ROM cassette (unless he had 
assistance to do so), since it would entail him directly rewriting his own personality. Wintermute 
confirms that the Flatline is rather set in his ways as a ROM construct, saying that “’The Flatline 
here, if you were all like him, it would be real simple. He’s a construct, just a buncha ROM, so 
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he always does what I expect him to.’” (Gibson, 245). In other words, existing as just personality 
data without a body has made the Flatline into something that appears more like one of the 
characters Wintermute uses; something I will look at in a moment. The Flatline also demands to 
be erased as payment for his services to Wintermute, strongly suggesting that his present state is 
an undesirable one, but also that his state still leaves him conscious and self-aware enough to 
make decisions about himself. 
 
Hayles, discussing Baudrillard, touches upon the idea that the distance between the 
signifier and the signified, or original object and simulacra, may collapse, so that the simulacra 
may actually displace the original object altogether. (Hayles, 249-250) Later, she also remarks 
that “[...] we can no longer simply assume that consciousness guarantees the existence of the 
self.” (Hayles, 280). The Flatline and his ROM-body are an attempt at a simulacra, one that has 
technically replaced the original – but only because the original no longer exists. In this instance, 
the distance between signifier and signified may appear to have collapsed initially, only to revert 
back to somewhere close to the initial position, due to the fact that the consciousness in the 
ROM-body is only a part of the original self. This reversal happens because there is still enough 
consciousness left to realize that it is incomplete compared to its original self. 
 
 One thing that Case does not immediately seem to realize, especially not before 
encountering the Flatline, is that body and mind are strongly linked; despite their apparent 
independence from one another in cyberspace. For an example, much of the brain is devoted to 
controlling the body’s functions, and the body is built to react to the signals from the brain. 
Removing the mind from the body and connecting the mind to cyberspace would not necessarily 
result in a freer, more powerful mind, but in a mind that is still configured to perform certain 
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functions that are no longer accomplishable because the body is gone. A large portion of an 
individual personality is also built around the body, such as self esteem, self confidence and so 
on. If Case had ended up like the Flatline, and existed solely as information, he might need to 
code himself a body in order to function properly, and if that were to happen he might end up 
limited to the extent he is when inhabiting a body made of real meat. This being said, Case does 
use his body to operate his cyberspace deck, so at some level he is probably aware of the fact that 
he needs it to do what he does.  
 
Bukatman also offers a useful point concerning the body in cyberspace; “The reader 
should not be misled by the references to “bodiless exultation,” by the way, for the subject in 
cyberspace is granted perception and mobility, conditions predicated upon a lived body; a new 
body, perhaps, but a body nonetheless.” (Bukatman, 207). This relates to what I have already 
said, with emphasis on the fact that since cyberspace is constructed so that it can be perceived by 
humans, and humans would have a hard time imagining themselves without some sort of body, 
the human must be represented by some sort of body in order to operate in cyberspace.  
 
 During the latter part of the story, Case is trapped in a closed off portion of cyberspace 
that is being controlled by Neuromancer. At that point, he seems to grow even more positively 
inclined towards his body. 
 
“Something he’d found and lost so many times. It belonged, he knew – he 
remembered – as she pulled him down, to the meat, the flesh the cowboys 
mocked. It was a vast thing, beyond knowing, a sea of information coded in spiral 
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and pheromone, infinite intricacy that only the body, in its strong blind way, could 
ever read.” (Gibson, 284). 
 
Perhaps it is the prospect of having his mind trapped in an unsatisfactory part of cyberspace, or 
the fact that he is back with Linda that makes him realize that he does appreciate his body to a 
greater extent than what he expresses when tries to act like a typical cowboy. It might also well 
be that his experience with the Flatline has made him realize that it would be dreary to exist 
without a body. At any rate, and perhaps most importantly, he is now viewing the whole body as 
information, not just the mind, which might make it easier to like. Melley offers another 
interpretation that could be applied to this topic, saying that  
 
“Without stable boundaries, the notions of persons as discrete individuals 
becomes suspect and finally threatens to fall away, leaving what Thomas Schaub 
calls “a continuity” that transcends the individual, replacing the idea of “’self’ as 
consciousness and memory” with “’self’ as intersection” (Pynchon, 49-50). What 
is so troubling about this intersection is the way it resists theorization, the way it 
appears simultaneously to be a vague mathematical grid and an immense 
individual.” (Melley, 102).  
 
This could be what Case has seen happening to the Flatline, who has his ROM-cassette to 
provide boundaries for his personality, but who still is removed from his old self, now being only 
an information pattern or “mathematical grid” if you will. Case has found renewed pleasure in 
his body after sleeping with Molly, and to borrow his own words, he needs the body as a vessel 
and a reading unit for the “sea of information”. Without the body to contain and shape the 
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information in it, the mind in cyberspace could end up as a diluted and stretched version of the 
original self.  
 
 The AI Wintermute, while extremely powerful in cyberspace, has limitations of its own 
outside of it. This is exemplified by Wintermute’s use of different “characters” in order to deal 
with Case and other humans. Molly explains this in the following way: “’Why he has to come on 
like the Finn or somebody, he told me that. It’s not just a mask, it’s like he uses real profiles as 
valves, gears himself down to communicate with us. Called it a template. Model of personality.’” 
(Gibson, 248-249). 
 
Apparently, this again concerns the limitations of human perception; Wintermute in its 
cyberspace-form is difficult or impossible for humans to perceive, and therefore the AI 
constructs characters that appear as real humans in order to bridge the communications gap. 
However, while it may seem that the reason for the use of characters is down to human 
inadequacy, it also appears that the AI itself is limited in how it is programmed. Wintermute, in 
the guise of the fence Finn, explains that “’Like I told Molly, these aren’t masks. I need ‘em to 
talk to you. ‘Cause I don’t have what you’d think of as a personality, much.’” (Gibson, 256). In 
other words, the reason Wintermute can not communicate with humans is indeed down to the 
fact that it exists in a form that would be hard for humans to grasp, but that form is a result of the 
AI’s programming.  
 
This also tells us something about how Case and other humans work in cyberspace. 
While it appears that Case would very much like to exist as pure information in cyberspace all 
the time, the fact that Wintermute also uses his characters when talking to Case inside 
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cyberspace suggests that this might not be possible, or at least not the experience he hoped for. 
Since Case is an individual, and is used to, and even limited to communicating with other 
individuals, it might be that he would still experience limitations if he existed solely as 
information in cyberspace. Unless the information in his mind was altered as it was downloaded 
into a computer, he would still be limited to communicating with entities that he could recognize 
as individuals. And if the information that makes up his personality was rewritten so as to allow 
him to bypass this limitation, it begs the question of whether he would still be Case, or even a 
recognizable individual. As Wintermute explains about itself to Case, it remarks that “’Your 
mistake, and it’s quite a logical one, is in confusing the Wintermute mainframe, Berne, with the 
Wintermute entity.’” (Gibson, 145). Here, we can presume that Case is making his assumption 
about the entity Wintermute either because he expects it to have something akin to a personality, 
or because he simply assumes that the AI must act as a whole. However, he fails to understand 
that there are parts of it he can’t understand, such as the fact that the AI can have a personality 
that does not encompass the whole of it, all software and hardware including.  
 
“Wintermute was hive mind, decision maker, effecting change in the world 
outside. Neuromancer was personality. Neuromancer was immortality. Marie-
France must have built something into Wintermute , the compulsion that had 
driven the thing to free itself, to unite with Neuromancer.” (Gibson, 315). 
 
While Wintermute is described as a hive mind here, which might seem to make it difficult for it 
to communicate with humans since it lacks a clear personality, it does make sense for 
Wintermute to be the one of the two AIs’ to interact with the outside world. While Neuromancer 
would seem to be the obvious choice for dealing with human individuals, one might also 
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consider that this could potentially make it less efficient at reaching the goal of uniting with 
Wintermute. Since Neuromancer has a clear personality, we might assume that it has some of the 
limitations of its human counterparts, and that its personality might cause it to make less rational 
decisions (for an AI at any rate) especially if it became closely connected with human 
individuals. Wintermute also has the ability to sustain several characters that are convincing 
enough to be of help to it, and it seems to be built around a very analytical core that can not only 
keep track of all the details in the big picture but that can also understand their significance and 
act when necessary. While its lack of a distinct personality makes it difficult for it to understand 
humans as more than just statistics, this same trait becomes useful as it needs to make long term 
plans based on many unknowns.  
 
Wintermute also has trouble understanding humans because of their form, a view that is 
supported by Hayles, who, when discussing the AI Helen in the Richard Powers book Galatea 
2.2. offers the view that 
 
“The problem that Helen confronts in learning human language is not that she is 
disembodied (a state no presence in the world can achieve!) but rather that her 
embodiment differs significantly from that of humans. There is nothing in her 
embodiment that corresponds to the bodily sensations encoded in human 
language.” (Hayles, 265). 
 
Without getting into a discussion about language and its role in human perception, thinking and 
identity (which is beyond the scope of this thesis), I believe we can safely say that Wintermute’s 
type of embodiment hinders it in its understanding of humans. While the AI can act through its 
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characters, this does not give it the experience of a human body in the same way humans 
experience it, because it does not convert its whole self into a human, it is merely running a 
program to approximate a human. When looking at the AIs’ from this angle, it also becomes 
clear that Neuromancer is also limited in its understanding of humans for the same reason as 
Wintermute is, although the fact that it has more of a clear personality would arguably give it 
better odds.  
 
 In a way, Wintermute is comparable to The Tristero in The Crying of Lot 49, as both 
operate in the background, are able to pull a lot of strings, and seem to be connected to long 
chains of, often seemingly unconnected, events. However, The Tristero never really comes out in 
the open, and possesses an apparently more malevolent agenda than Wintermute. In addition, 
The Tristero is not one single entity that acts with one single will, the latter being especially clear 
since Oedipa discovers evidence of internal struggle in the organisation. Wintermute, unlike The 
Tristero, does not seem to be after power in the form of direct control over others, although that 
would be a side effect of it merging with Neuromancer and encompassing cyberspace. While 
Wintermute does not use methods that can be described as wholly subtle, its goal is to merge 
with Neuromancer, not to cause havoc. Wintermute also exists as a fairly open player; at the very 
least it is possible to come into contact with it, and it does disclose parts of its plans and agenda.  
Obviously, the protagonists in the stories also have different points of departure; Oedipa is at 
least partly in opposition to The Tristero, while Case does his work for Wintermute without any 
apparent regrets.  
 
 Concerning Oedipa, we have seen that the human element often tends to increase entropy 
in a system. In Neuromancer, entropy is not as strong a theme, which, perhaps accidentally, fits 
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with the fact that the story takes place in a world where the human element is less involved in 
information processing. However, there is one element that might be considered as increasing 
entropy; the difficulty humans have when interacting with an AI and vice versa. For both parties, 
it is very much a question of the bodily limitations already discussed, whether or not we are 
considering a body made of meat or data. In essence, we get two different signal types going to 
two different receivers, and unfortunately each signal is going to the receiver it has the most 
difficulty in reaching. In the case of Wintermute, it has to send signals in its own very much 
rational language to humans which, while possessing rational capabilities, also have a tendency 
to act irrationally. Wintermute must base its decisions on statistics, which are difficult to apply to 
irrational behaviour. In addition, Wintermute has to use less than ideal channels of 
communications, its characters. While they do manage their job fairly well, it is difficult to 
perfectly manage a medium one does not understand fully. Case and his colleagues have similar 
problems when communicating with an AI. The fact that Case can not fully comprehend 
Wintermute does run the risk of increasing entropy, because some information may be lost in 
translation – a fact that also applies to the AI’s communication as directed towards humans. As I 
have said, entropy is no major theme in the story, and it does not concern the stream of 
information as clearly as in The Crying of Lot 49, but there is a certain potential for chaos at 
hand. Bukatman states that “The interface relocates the human, in fact redefines the human as 
part of a cybernetic system of information circulation and management.” (Bukatman, 192). This 
underlines the fact that Case has a much stronger connection to information than what Oedipa 
has. While both are part of a communications system, Case is part of a much more efficient 
system and he has better access to the different parts of the system, which while it does not 
guarantee a complete absence of entropy at least reduces the risk for it.  
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 There is, as we have seen, a certain body/mind duality present in Neuromancer especially 
in relation to Case and his disdain for his body. However, I believe that this is less down to a 
view advocating the non-physicality of the mind and its separate existence from the body, but 
more a case of minds unfortunately separated from their body. 
 
 When it comes to the Flatline and Linda Lee, we are dealing with minds that have been 
saved from the death of their bodies. While both personalities still exist, they only do so in a 
reduced form if we look at the Flatline, or in less than free circumstances if we look at Linda. We 
have already established that the body is rather firmly anchored to the mind and the other way 
around, and while both forms of existence are manageable in one way or another, they still leave 
the personality with less than what they had when their minds were still in their bodies.  
 
 Wintermute and Neuromancer are perhaps best described as body and mind respectively. 
Wintermute possesses all the effector limbs, the ability to interact with the outside world, but 
lacks a clear personality. Neuromancer on the other hand is mostly personality, but without the 
necessary tools to act according to its own thoughts. The melding of the two AIs does not 
involve melding two separate personalities, but two parts of one body, each incomplete without 
the other.  
 
 Case never experiences any proper separation of body and mind, except for very short 
periods of time when he flatlines, and while he does temporarily wish for such a separation to 
occur, he too seems to realize that body and mind belong together, no matter how different they 
seem. All these views fit well with cybernetics, since both body and mind consist of information, 
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albeit information arranged differently. At any rate, the different types of information are keyed 
to work in concert with each other, not separately.  
 
 Communication and its relation to control also has its role in Neuromancer, not at all 
surprising in a society so saturated with information. Case for an example, is controlled by 
Wintermute through its characters for some time, a fact he probably would not have discovered if 
Wintermute had not revealed itself to him. Wintermute’s characters are quite interesting because 
they allow the real sender of the message, Wintermute, to send it directly to a receiver that 
believes he or she is receiving the message from someone else, at least until the real nature of the 
receiver is revealed. The nature of the message is also two-faced in this regard, since what may 
appear as a message telling the receiver to do one seemingly normal thing is in fact a message 
that gets the receiver to cause one event in a linked chain of events. This is a rather efficient way 
of doing things, since the receiver will receive one semantically significant message, and send 
out what is in essence two messages in one – causing both the intended effect and by doing so 
triggering another effect. The latter may not be in the receiver’s best interest, but it can be 
difficult to detect the potential for it in the original incoming message. Although, this also 
involves a certain element of risk, because it can increase entropy, as we have seen. Whether it 
works or not hinges on whether the sender of the message properly manages to differentiate 
between his or her preferred reaction to the message and the receivers’ actual reaction.  
 
 One important difference between Case and Oedipa in relation to communication and 
control is the way they react to receiving information. As we have seen, Oedipa ends up being 
controlled by the information she receives, not necessarily because that is the intent of the 
sender, but because the sheer amount of information is too much for her to handle efficiently. 
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Case on the other hand, while receiving large amounts of information, does much better at 
processing it, especially when it comes to checking the veracity of it in order to avoid falling 
prey to false leads. In other words, he is better at employing proper feedback mechanisms than 
Oedipa. That being said, the information Case receives is connected to more readily identifiable 
tasks and goals, which means that he has the privilege of a certain sense of direction in his work. 
Oedipa on the other hand has only one very large question to answer, with a process leading up 
to it that lacks a clear set of stages.  
 
 To a certain extent, Case displays a certain need to become information by gaining it; to 
change himself by interacting with vast fields of raw data instead of the physical world. He 
prefers cyberspace over the physical world, and the use of drugs when in the physical world 
suggests that he tries to distance himself from reality and move himself closer to the state he 
experiences in cyberspace. His disregard for flatlining might be taken as an indication towards a 
certain hope for getting stuck in cyberspace permanently, as if the body dying while being 
connected to cyberspace might give the mind a chance to flee it and store itself in cyberspace. 
There is perhaps some envy present towards Wintermute, at least before Wintermute’s 
connection and relation to Neuromancer is revealed. In a way, Case does become information by 
gaining it; not by separating his body from his mind, but rather by integrating his mind deeper 
into his body, by realizing that he already consists of one hundred percent information. Although 
the information is not arranged in the way he would ideally prefer, it is at least a better 
alternative than reducing the amount of information in him by sealing his mind in an electronic 
memory module. As Hayles argues throughout How We Became Posthuman, there is no such 
thing as disembodiment, and as she says, “[...] embodiment replaces a body seen as a support 
system for the mind [...]” (Hayles, 288), a view I agree with. However, she also argues that 
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Neuromancer represents a “[...] view that parses virtuality as a division between an inert body 
that is left behind and a disembodied subjectivity that inhabits a virtual realm [...]” (Hayles, 290). 
I believe Case does change his embodiment in the course of the story, going from a more 
disembodied view to a state where the two are more integrated. He might start out with a view of 
body-mind separation, but he does not keep it, he might still feel the “bodiless exultation” of 
cyberspace, but he accepts the fact that his body is a permanent part of him. 
 
5. Conclusion: efficiency in worlds apart 
Whether or not Norbert Wiener ever thought that cybernetics might be applied to 
literature is hard to say, but he certainly felt a need to apply it to contemporary society by writing 
The Human Use of Human Beings. While several researchers have tackled cybernetics in relation 
to literature, many of them have chosen to do so by looking at texts that might be termed 
“cybernetic” in themselves, containing for an example elements of advanced technology and 
human-machine relations, such as Neuromancer. In addition, a lot of work limits itself to looking 
at a few elements from cybernetic theory in the text, such as entropy, rather than applying a 
larger part of the theory to things like character motivation and actions. This approach is 
understandable, given that it makes sense to use a theory of information that has strong links 
with technology to analyse texts that mirror these qualities as closely as possible. Part of the 
motivation for this thesis, then, has been to attempt to use a larger part of the cybernetic model to 
look not only at a “cybernetic” text, but also at a text that seem less like a fiction version of a 
book on cybernetic theory.  
 
Neuromancer and The Crying of Lot 49 might at the first glance not seem like ideal 
candidates for comparison. Where Neuromancer features a hyper-advanced version of our own 
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world, containing technology we have just barely begun to research beyond the purely theoretical 
level, The Crying of Lot 49 offers a world based on the west coast of the United States in the 
1960s, where information technology is mainly limited to the television and telephone. While 
computers do exist in the world Oedipa Maas inhabits, there is not any such thing as a personal 
computer available. This contrast does however offer a good base for comparison, because, while 
the technology levels are different, information plays a major role in both texts.  The protagonists 
offer further ground for a contrastive analysis, given that Oedipa Maas, inhabiting the low-tech 
world, is also the character with the least experience in information processing on a larger level. 
Case, in his high-tech world, is the character with the most experience, and the largest potential 
processing capabilities. In addition, while Oedipa qualifies as an “ordinary” human being, Case 
is much closer to being what N. Katherine Hayles terms “posthuman”. 
 
Viewing these contrasts from a cybernetics point of view first of all gives us a foundation 
that is ideally suited to treating texts that deal with large amounts of information. As we have 
seen, instances in the texts can be analysed with respect to different aspects of the cybernetic 
framework, such as entropy, feedback, processing power and so on. In addition, these elements 
can then be analysed and compared to each other to give a picture of the efficiency of the 
different systems in the text. The cybernetics framework thus allows both an examination of the 
details of a text as well as an examination of larger parts of the text that contain several of these 
details.  
 
It is no surprise, and perhaps even fitting, that Oedipa, living in the world she lives in, 
experiences substantially larger difficulties than Case when attempting to process or put 
information into use. While entropy does, and indeed must, affect both characters and their 
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surroundings, it presents a far greater obstacle to Oedipa than it does to Case. As we have seen, 
the reason for this is a combination of the human and human communication as an entropic 
element as well as a distinct lack of mechanical assistance and proper feedback mechanism. In 
Oedipa’s world, it is extremely difficult to act suitably on received information; information that 
is not immediately analysed successfully can at best be discarded and forgotten, a strategy 
Oedipa does not choose, or at worst it can stay in storage and interfere with future incoming 
messages. Unfortunately for Oedipa, she sees the usefulness of information but lacks the 
processing power to put it to good use, resulting in the above mentioned interference. In addition, 
Oedipa receives information in many different forms, which tend to interfere with each other to 
such an extent as to increase entropy. Case avoids this problem by receiving a lot of his 
information in cyberspace, which by its nature lets information be sorted and processed more 
easily, without undue interference. 
 
The world of Neuromancer is the polar opposite of The Crying of Lot 49. While Case 
must still do his fair share of work to get use out of information, it is possible for him and others 
in his world to receive, process, and act upon large quantities of information. This is largely due 
to the advanced technology available, and in particular the connection between man and machine 
that it allows, but perhaps also a result of the experience gained from living in a world where 
information is as important and abundant as it is in Neuromancer. As Case overcomes the 
reservations against the human body typical of a cowboy, he becomes at the very least a 
prototype for Hayles’ ideal posthuman, “[...]a version of the posthuman that embraces the 
possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power 
and disembodied immortality [...]” (Hayles, 5). 
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The Crying of Lot 49 illustrates the cybernetic principle that information is everywhere, 
even if it might not appear so. It presents us with a world that has less visible signs of 
information transfer, especially compared to the world in Neuromancer. Yet the information is 
there, potentially in unexpected places like a city. But whereas Case and many others in his 
world can access this hidden information as well as the more visible kind, Oedipa does not 
possess this capacity. However good or bad the efficiency of a system is, and regardless how 
much a system differs from another one, the fact that it is recognizable as an information system 
allows us to use cybernetics to look at it, analyse it, and hopefully understand why and how it 
works as it does. The question that remains is whether or not we in Oedipa’s position are always 
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